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Message-ID: <14202.1320696659@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 15:10:59 -0500
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts
On Mon, 07 Nov 2011 11:18:32 PST, "H. Peter Anvin" said:
> I would like to propose that we add a mount option to procfs, and
> possibly sysfs, called, say, admingrp. These kinds of files then get
> restricted to the admingrp (defaulting to gid 0 if no admingrp is
> provided). Historically on Unix there has been a group of people
> (usually "adm", but sometimes "log") who are allowed to read (but not
> write) the log files, which also contains potentially sensitive information.
Probably should be a two part - mount with 'gid=NNN', and then a
perm=027 or whatever, to be treated similar to a umask. So 027
would allow root to do anything, would disable write for the gid= group,
and turn it off completely for others. Less paranoid sites could mount
it with perm=002.
Does that cover most of the use cases?
> The current Linux trend seems to be do instead force those users to
> become root constantly, which is *not* helping the situation.
Amen, brother. ;)
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