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Message-ID: <20111117213157.GS20508@moon>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 01:31:57 +0400
From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT capability and filter map_files/
access
On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 12:54:14PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
...
> >
> > It's hard to have a specific dialogue without the full c/r patchset and
> > idea of the architecture of the exploiters (ie c/r and maybe
> > debuggers)
> >
> > Sorry, the security implications of the in-kernel c/r syscalls were
> > pretty simple and clear to me, but those of the new approach are not.
>
> yup.
>
> From a development-order perspective perhaps it is better to get
> everything working and stabilized for root first. Then as a separate
> activity start working on making it available to less-privileged users.
>
> We would need to be confident that such a second development effort
> doesn't cause back-compatibility issues (ie: interface changes) for
> existing root users.
>
> Is it possible that once everything is working for root, we realise
> that we can get it all working for non-root users via suitable setuid
> userspace tools?
Once it operates well under root (actually I'm testing it under kvm with
root account) I believe tuning code up for non-root users should be possible
too. At moment I need cap-sys-admin only because of map_files/ but technically
I barely need ptrace over dumping task(s) and access to map_files.
Cyrill
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