Date:	Fri, 18 Nov 2011 11:27:14 +0100
From:	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...ito.it>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC:	Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] ima: split ima_add_digest_entry() function

On 11/17/2011 10:15 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2011-11-17 at 11:57 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> On 11/16/2011 07:52 PM, Rajiv Andrade wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks, Rajiv Andrade Security Development IBM Linux Technology Center
>>>
>>> On 16-11-2011 12:37, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>> On 11/16/2011 02:38 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 2011-11-16 at 11:10 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>>>> The ima_add_digest_entry() function has been split in order to avoid
>>>>>> adding an entry in the measurements list for which the PCR extend
>>>>>> operation subsequently fails. Required memory is allocated earlier
>>>>>> in the
>>>>>> new function ima_prepare_template_entry() and the template entry is
>>>>>> added
>>>>>> after ima_pcr_extend().
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu<roberto.sassu@...ito.it>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Mimi
>>>>
>>>> i don't know if this condition can happen, but suppose that
>>>> for whatever reason the PCR extend fails. In this case, since
>>>> the PCR is not extended, the measurements list can be modified,
>>>> by removing the non-measured entry, without this fact being
>>>> detected by the verifier. So, probably we can avoid to display
>>>> the entry.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Hi Roberto,
>>>
>>> IMA's trustworthiness is built on the assumption that the TPM underneath
>>> can
>>> be trusted. If that can't be, the eventlog alone doesn't provide us any
>>> security.
>>> It's the TPM device driver's job though to workaround any HW bug so that
>>> in the
>>> end all its stakeholders have their commands processed successfully, as
>>> we've
>>> pursued in some changes here:
>>>
>>
>> Hi Rajiv
>>
>> thanks for your comments.
>>
>> I absolutely agree that we have to trust the TPM for the correct
>> execution of IMA.
>>
>> I think the principle that has been used to build IMA (according
>> to the TGC specifications) is that we can trust the eventlog
>> as long as the measurement infrastructure is reliable or it is
>> possible to detect a threat from previous measurements.
>>
>> For this reason, a system call is never executed before the
>> inode measurement is inserted in the eventlog and the PCR
>> is extended. Since these operations must be considered as
>> atomic, their execution is protected by a mutex, that is
>> released only after all tasks have been performed. This
>> ensures that we begin with a measured kernel and we can
>> reliably measure all further interactions. This also explains,
>> in my view, why delaying the PCR extend operation may lead
>> to security risks.
>>
>> About my patch, i did not move out the protected region any
>> of the above described operations. Instead, i'm preventing
>> measurements for which the PCR extend failed to be added to
>> the measurements list, because in any case it is impossible
>> for a verifier to detect their removal from the list.
>>
>> As i mentioned in the previous mail, one solution to overcome
>> this issue is to deny, on the platform running IMA, the execution
>> of those system calls for which the measurement process ended
>> with an error.
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> Roberto Sassu
>
> True, if the TPM failed to extend the PCR, a malicious user would be
> able to remove the measurement from the measurement list without it
> being detected.  However, according to the TPM specs, the PCR extend
> operation is always suppose to succeed, even in the case when the TPM is
> not enabled.
>

Hi Mimi

i don't know if this can happen, but, since the TPM always returns
a result in its response, there may be particular conditions under
which the PCR extend fails.

After quickly looking at the code in 'drivers/char/tpm.c' there are
some additional cases where the operation may fail. For instance,
an operation may have been cancelled or it may have just reached the
defined time limit.


> More importantly we need to be able to detect when the PCR has not been
> extended appropriately in order to address it.  Otherwise we're just
> covering it up.
>

Probably i did not understand this point, but do the return code of 
tpm_pcr_extend() is not sufficient to determine if the operation was
completed successfully?

Roberto Sassu


> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>

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