lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Wed, 21 Dec 2011 00:59:36 +0200
From:	Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@...il.com>
To:	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
Cc:	avi@...hat.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	jan.kiszka@...mens.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] kvm: Device assignment permission checks

On Tue, 2011-12-20 at 07:30 -0700, Alex Williamson wrote:
> Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
> 
>  - Are not bridges
>  - Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
>  - The user has permissions to use
> 
> Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
> typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
> Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
> also don't have host drivers.  We don't want users to hold such devices
> captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
> domain.  We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
> has access to the PCI sysfs resource files.  By default a normal user
> will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
> that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> ---
> 
>  Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt |    4 +++
>  virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c           |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> index ee2c96b..4df9af4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> @@ -1154,6 +1154,10 @@ following flags are specified:
>  The KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU flag is a mandatory option to ensure
>  isolation of the device.  Usages not specifying this flag are deprecated.
>  
> +Only PCI header type 0 devices with PCI BAR resources are supported by
> +device assignment.  The user requesting this ioctl must have read/write
> +access to the PCI sysfs resource files associated with the device.
> +
>  4.49 KVM_DEASSIGN_PCI_DEVICE
>  
>  Capability: KVM_CAP_DEVICE_DEASSIGNMENT
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c b/virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c
> index a251a28..faec641 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
>  #include <linux/pci.h>
>  #include <linux/interrupt.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/namei.h>
>  #include "irq.h"
>  
>  static struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *kvm_find_assigned_dev(struct list_head *head,
> @@ -483,9 +484,11 @@ out:
>  static int kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
>  				      struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
>  {
> -	int r = 0, idx;
> +	int r = 0, idx, i;
>  	struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
>  	struct pci_dev *dev;
> +	u8 header_type;
> +	bool bar_found = false;
>  
>  	if (!(assigned_dev->flags & KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU))
>  		return -EINVAL;
> @@ -516,6 +519,56 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
>  		r = -EINVAL;
>  		goto out_free;
>  	}
> +
> +	/* Don't allow bridges to be assigned */
> +	pci_read_config_byte(dev, PCI_HEADER_TYPE, &header_type);
> +	if ((header_type & PCI_HEADER_TYPE) != PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL) {
> +		r = -EPERM;
> +		goto out_put;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* We want to test whether the caller has been granted permissions to
> +	 * use this device.  To be able to configure and control the device,
> +	 * the user needs access to PCI configuration space and BAR resources.
> +	 * These are accessed through PCI sysfs.  PCI config space is often
> +	 * passed to the process calling this ioctl via file descriptor, so we
> +	 * can't rely on access to that file.  We can check for permissions
> +	 * on each of the BAR resource files, which is a pretty clear
> +	 * indicator that the user has been granted access to the device. */
> +	for (i = PCI_STD_RESOURCES; i <= PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END; i++) {
> +		char buf[64];
> +		struct path path;
> +		struct inode *inode;
> +
> +		if (!pci_resource_len(dev, i))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		/* Per sysfs-rules, sysfs is always at /sys */
> +		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/sys/bus/pci/devices/%04x:%02x:"
> +			 "%02x.%d/resource%d", pci_domain_nr(dev->bus),
> +			 dev->bus->number, PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn),
> +			 PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn), i);

This should probably be done by grabbing devname out of
'dev' (kobject_get_path(&dev->dev.kobj, GFP_KERNEL) ) instead of
formatting it ourselves. This is also mentioned to be always correct in
sysfs-rules while this method isn't.

> +
> +		r = kern_path(buf, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
> +		if (r)
> +			goto out_put;
> +
> +		inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
> +
> +		r = inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_ACCESS);
> +		path_put(&path);
> +		if (r)
> +			goto out_put;
> +
> +		bar_found = true;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* If no resources, probably something special */
> +	if (!bar_found) {
> +		r = -EPERM;
> +		goto out_put;
> +	}

Maybe it's also worth it to move this block out to a helped function and
wrap it by CONFIG_SYSFS. I'm not sure what can happen when sysfs doesn't
exist, but it's best to just avoid any of these corner cases.

-- 

Sasha.

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ