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Message-ID: <20111228170116.GQ17712@google.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2011 09:01:16 -0800
From: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Matt Helsley <matthltc@...ibm.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/4] Add routine for generating an ID for kernel pointer
Hello,
On Wed, Dec 28, 2011 at 08:53:36PM +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> Well, it is not deciding but it should be taken into account. One could
> be reading this IDs again and again and again affecting performance of
> the whole system,
I can't see how it would affect performance of the whole system.
Calculating hash doesn't involve any further locking or use of scarce
global resource. It would add small amount memory and processing
overhead for the task reading the hash. It sure is something to be
considered but I really don't think this should be a major factor
here.
> which means I really would prefer to limit access to such
> features (ie root-only). If (as I said) for other cases there is simply no way to
> _not_ use crypto, our case might be the one where using crypto is redundant.
Limiting it to root and just exporting printer (or maybe XOR with a
randomish value) may be good enough. I don't know. However, we no
longer consider exporting pointers to unpriviliedged userland safe and
this can be useful in many circumstances, so if it's not too
difficult, I think trying to use proper hash would be nide.
Thanks.
--
tejun
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