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Message-ID: <1326383015.7642.77.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:43:35 -0500
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
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Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
On Wed, 2012-01-11 at 11:25 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
> Filter programs may _only_ cross the execve(2) barrier if last filter
> program was attached by a task with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities in its
> user namespace. Once a task-local filter program is attached from a
> process without privileges, execve will fail. This ensures that only
> privileged parent task can affect its privileged children (e.g., setuid
> binary).
This means that a non privileged user can not run another program with
limited features? How would a process exec another program and filter
it? I would assume that the filter would need to be attached first and
then the execv() would be performed. But after the filter is attached,
the execv is prevented?
Maybe I don't understand this correctly.
-- Steve
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