linux-kernel - Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

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Message-ID: <CAObL_7HE6_NE79tKASQcAxyvCS_7L=vMqfjvZDbCe99pa2t8Wg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:18:55 -0800
From:	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
	serge.hallyn@...onical.com, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com, djm@...drot.org,
	segoon@...nwall.com, jmorris@...ei.org, scarybeasts@...il.com,
	avi@...hat.com, penberg@...helsinki.fi, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	mingo@...e.hu, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com,
	borislav.petkov@....com, amwang@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com,
	ak@...ux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@...il.com, gregkh@...e.de,
	dhowells@...hat.com, daniel.lezcano@...e.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 9:09 AM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 8:27 AM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
>>
>> In that case, just have execv fail if filtering is enabled and we are
>> execing a setuid program. But I don't see why non "magical" execv's
>> should be prohibited.
>
> The whole "fail security escalations" thing goes way beyond just
> filtering, I think we could seriously try to make it a generic
> feature.
>
> For example, somebody just asked me the other day why "chroot()"
> requires admin privileges, since it would be good to limit even
> non-root things.
>
> And it's really the exact same issue as filtering: in some sense,
> chroot() "filters" FS name lookups, and can be used to fool programs
> that are written to be secure.
>
> We could easily introduce a per-process flag that just says "cannot
> escalate privileges". Which basically just disables execve() of
> suid/sgid programs (and possibly other things too), and locks the
> process to the current privileges. And then make the rule be that *if*
> that flag is set, you can then filter across an execve, or chroot as a
> normal user, or whatever.

Like this?

http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1003.3/01225.html

(This depends on execve_nosecurity, which is controversial, but that
dependency would be trivial to remove.)

Note that there's a huge can of worms if execve is allowed but
suid/sgid is not: selinux may elevate privileges on exec of pretty
much anything.  (I think that this is a really awful idea, but it's in
the kernel, so we're stuck with it.)

--Andy
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