linux-kernel - Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

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Message-ID: <CA+55aFxszOU=RzZ8Hgof+AAi+F2xW71-KX9DZqOJTT=vQ9gSnQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:00:58 -0800
From:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
Cc:	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
	john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
	coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
	djm@...drot.org, segoon@...nwall.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
	scarybeasts@...il.com, avi@...hat.com, penberg@...helsinki.fi,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, mingo@...e.hu, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com, amwang@...hat.com,
	oleg@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@...il.com,
	gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com, daniel.lezcano@...e.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 11:46 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu> wrote:
>
> I think securebits and cred didn't exist the first time I did this,
> and sticking it in struct cred might unnecessarily prevent sharing
> cred (assuming that even happens).  So I'd say task_struct.

I think it almost has to be task state, since we very much want to
make sure it's trivial to see that nothing ever clears that bit, and
that it always gets copied right over a fork/exec/whatever.

Putting it in some cred or capability bit or somethin would make that
kind of transparency pretty much totally impossible.

                 Linus
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