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Message-Id: <20120112135803.1fb98fd6.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:58:03 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@...il.com>, lizf@...fujitsu.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>,
Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@...onical.com>,
ecryptfs@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: Don't warn if memdup_user fails
On Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:19:54 -0800 (PST)
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Jan 2012, Pekka Enberg wrote:
>
> > I think you missed Andrew's point. We absolutely want to issue a
> > kernel warning here because ecryptfs is misusing the memdup_user()
> > API. We must not let userspace processes allocate large amounts of
> > memory arbitrarily.
> >
>
> I think it's good to fix ecryptfs like Tyler is doing and, at the same
> time, ensure that the len passed to memdup_user() makes sense prior to
> kmallocing memory with GFP_KERNEL. Perhaps something like
>
> if (WARN_ON(len > PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER))
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> in which case __GFP_NOWARN is irrelevant.
If someone is passing huge size_t's into kmalloc() and getting failures
then that's probably a bug. So perhaps we should add a warning to
kmalloc itself if the size_t is out of bounds, and !__GFP_NOWARN.
That might cause problems with those callers who like to call kmalloc()
in a probing loop with decreasing size_t.
But none of this will be very effective. If someone is passing an
unchecked size_t into kmalloc then normal testing will not reveal the
problem because the testers won't pass stupid numbers into their
syscalls.
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