| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <4F0F8029.9030508@xenotime.net>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 16:51:53 -0800
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
CC: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
djm@...drot.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
segoon@...nwall.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
scarybeasts@...il.com, avi@...hat.com, penberg@...helsinki.fi,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, luto@....edu, mingo@...e.hu,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
amwang@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
eric.dumazet@...il.com, gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com,
daniel.lezcano@...e.fr, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
On 01/12/2012 03:38 PM, Will Drewry wrote:
> include/linux/prctl.h | 3 +
> include/linux/seccomp.h | 68 +++++-
> kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> kernel/fork.c | 4 +
> kernel/seccomp.c | 8 +
> kernel/seccomp_filter.c | 620 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/sys.c | 4 +
> security/Kconfig | 12 +
> 8 files changed, 717 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 kernel/seccomp_filter.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> index cc7a4e9..0296871 100644
> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -5,9 +5,28 @@
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>
> #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> #include <asm/seccomp.h>
>
> -typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
> +struct seccomp_filter;
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_struct - the state of a seccomp'ed process
> + *
> + * @mode:
> + * if this is 0, seccomp is not in use.
> + * is 1, the process is under standard seccomp rules.
> + * is 2, the process is only allowed to make system calls where
> + * associated filters evaluate successfully.
> + * @filter: Metadata for filter if using CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER.
> + * @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
> + * is no guard.
> + */
> +typedef struct seccomp_struct {
> + int mode;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter;
> +#endif
> +} seccomp_t;
>
> extern void __secure_computing(int);
> static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
> @@ -28,8 +47,7 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
>
> #include <linux/errno.h>
>
> -typedef struct { } seccomp_t;
> -
> +typedef struct seccomp_struct { } seccomp_t;
> #define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
>
> static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
> @@ -49,4 +67,48 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +
> +
> +extern long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *);
> +
> +extern struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *);
> +extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *);
> +
> +extern int seccomp_test_filters(int);
> +extern void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int);
> +extern void seccomp_struct_fork(struct seccomp_struct *child,
> + const struct seccomp_struct *parent);
> +
> +static inline void seccomp_struct_init_task(struct seccomp_struct *seccomp)
> +{
> + seccomp->mode = 0;
> + seccomp->filter = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +/* No locking is needed here because the task_struct will
> + * have no parallel consumers.
> + */
(in multiple places:) Kernel multi-line comment style is:
/*
* first line of text
* more stuff
*/
> +static inline void seccomp_struct_free_task(struct seccomp_struct *seccomp)
> +{
> + put_seccomp_filter(seccomp->filter);
> + seccomp->filter = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
> +
> +#include <linux/errno.h>
> +
> +struct seccomp_filter { };
> +/* Macros consume the unused dereference by the caller. */
> +#define seccomp_struct_init_task(_seccomp) do { } while (0);
> +#define seccomp_struct_fork(_tsk, _orig) do { } while (0);
> +#define seccomp_struct_free_task(_seccomp) do { } while (0);
> +
> +static inline long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *a2)
> +{
> + return -ENOSYS;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
> #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 57d4b13..78719be 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
> return;
> } while (*++syscall);
> break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> + case 2:
Can we get macros (defines) for these @modes instead of using
inline constants?
> + if (seccomp_test_filters(this_syscall) == 0)
> + return;
> +
> + seccomp_filter_log_failure(this_syscall);
> + break;
> +#endif
> default:
> BUG();
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp_filter.c b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..108a3f3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
> +/* bpf program-based system call filtering
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
> + * (at your option) any later version.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
> + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
> + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@...omium.org>
> + */
> +
...
> +/* seccomp_struct_fork: manages inheritance on fork
/**
* seccomp_struct_fork - manages inheritance on fork
> + * @child: forkee's seccomp_struct
> + * @parent: forker's seccomp_struct
> + * Ensures that @child inherit a seccomp_filter iff seccomp is enabled
> + * and the set of filters is marked as 'enabled'.
> + */
> +void seccomp_struct_fork(struct seccomp_struct *child,
> + const struct seccomp_struct *parent)
> +{
> + if (!parent->mode)
> + return;
> + child->mode = parent->mode;
> + child->filter = get_seccomp_filter(parent->filter);
> +}
> +
> +/* Returns a pointer to the BPF evaluator after checking the offset and size
> + * boundaries. The signature almost matches the signature from
> + * net/core/filter.c with the hopes of sharing code in the future.
Use kernel multi-line comment style.
> + */
> +static const void *load_pointer(const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
> + int offset, size_t size,
> + void *unused)
> +{
> + if (offset >= buflen)
> + goto fail;
> + if (offset < 0)
> + goto fail;
> + if (size > buflen - offset)
> + goto fail;
> + return buf + offset;
> +fail:
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 51bd5a0..77b1106 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -84,6 +84,18 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
> + bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
> + select SECCOMP
> + depends on EXPERIMENTAL
> + help
> + This kernel feature expands CONFIG_SECCOMP to allow computing
> + in environments with reduced kernel access dictated by a system
> + call filter, expressed in BPF, installed by the application itself
> + through prctl(2).
This help text is only useful to someone who already knows what it does/means
IMO.
> +
> + See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
Yes, I'll look at that..
> +
> config SECURITY
> bool "Enable different security models"
> depends on SYSFS
--
~Randy
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists