linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always

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Message-ID: <20120114133053.GY7180@jl-vm1.vm.bytemark.co.uk>
Date:	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 13:30:53 +0000
From:	Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
	john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
	coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
	djm@...drot.org, segoon@...nwall.com, rostedt@...dmis.org,
	jmorris@...ei.org, scarybeasts@...il.com, avi@...hat.com,
	penberg@...helsinki.fi, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, mingo@...e.hu,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
	amwang@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
	eric.dumazet@...il.com, gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com,
	daniel.lezcano@...e.fr, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
	alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch

Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 5:11 PM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu> wrote:
> >
> > What if you're a daemon that needs something like CAP_NET_BIND but
> > also wants to be able to run other helpers without CAP_NET_BIND?
> >
> > (Also, preventing dropping of privileges will probably make a patch
> > more complicted -- I'll have to find and update all the places that
> > allow dropping privileges.)
> 
> Hey, if it actually makes it more complicated to say "don't change
> privileges", then I guess my argument that it should be simpler is
> wrong.
> 
> That said, the thing you bring up is *not* the actual use-case for the
> suggestion. The use-case is a "run untrusted code". So the use-case
> would be to set the flag after you've dropped CAP_NET_BIND, and
> *before* you actually run the other helpers. You clearly must have a
> fork() or something like that there, since you want to keep the
> NET_BIND in the original daemon.

Well suppose you don't trust the daemon either.  It might be running
in a network namespace where it's safe for untrusted code to bind to
low ports.

Or maybe you just need to let it bind willy-nilly among a restricted
subset of low ports - which of course you would like to restrict with
the seccomp filter.

(This can't happen right now because the filter can only look at
arguments, not memory pointed to - so it can't look at the port
number.  Can it even see when sys_bind is called on archs like x86
that use sys_socketcall?!)

Anyway the principle is there - CAP_NET_BIND doesn't necessarily mean
the daemon code is trusted.

-- Jamie
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