linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Fix race in process_vm_rw

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Message-ID: <20120114175829.GA32638@redhat.com>
Date:	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:58:29 +0100
From:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To:	Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@....ibm.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix race in process_vm_rw_core

On 01/14, Christopher Yeoh wrote:
>
> On Fri, 13 Jan 2012 17:04:42 +0100
> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On 01/13, Christopher Yeoh wrote:
> > > ...
> > > +struct mm_struct *get_check_task_mm(struct task_struct *task,
> > > unsigned int mode) +{
> > > +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> > > +	int err;
> > > +
> > > +	err =
> > > mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> > > +	if (err)
> > > +		return ERR_PTR(err);
> > > +
> > > +	task_lock(task);
> > > +	if (__ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
> > > +		mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
> > > +		goto out;
> > > +	}
> >
> > Probably you should check "mm != current->mm" before
> > __ptrace_may_access(), otherwise this changes the rules for,
> > say, /proc/pid/maps.
>
> __ptrace_may_access has a check for task == current already -
> Is that sufficient?
>
> 	/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
> 	if (task == current)
> 		return 0;

I don't think this is sufficient in the multithreaded or CLONE_VM case,
task_cred/etc is per-thread.

It is not that I think that this "current->mm != mm" check is important,
in fact personally I think it shouldn't exist.

But we shouldn't add the subtle and not documented behavioural change, and
obviously process_vm_rw() has no security problems if mm == current->mm.

> > > +	mm = get_check_task_mm(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
> > > +	if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
> > > +		if (!mm)
> > > +			rc = -EINVAL;
> > > +		else
> > > +			rc = -EPERM;
> >
> > Cosmetic nit. I won't insist, but why -EPERM is better than -EACCES
> > returned by get_check_task_mm()? IOW, why not rc = PTR_ERR() ?
>
> Maybe I should just convert EACCES to EPERM for process_vm_rw_core. I
> left get_check_task_mm with EACCESS to preserve existing behaviour
> for mm_for_maps.
>
> SUSv3 defines EACCES and EPERM as
>
> [EACCES]
> Permission denied. An attempt was made to access a file in a way
> forbidden by its file access permissions.
>
> [EPERM]
> Operation not permitted. An attempt was made to perform an operation
> limited to processes with appropriate privileges or to the owner of a
> file or other resource.
>
> So EPERM is more appropriate for process_vm_readv/writev

Well, imho EACCES would be fine too and my point was s/EINTR/EPERM/
looks a bit confusing.

But OK, this is subjective and minor, I won't argue.

Oleg.

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