Message-ID: <CABqD9hYg79C6ctW6dzsV1CQ8e3zDpAWiiRP+C1PgC2M6huubvA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 19:41:03 -0600
From:	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
To:	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
	john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
	coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
	djm@...drot.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	segoon@...nwall.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	scarybeasts@...il.com, avi@...hat.com, penberg@...helsinki.fi,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, luto@....edu, mingo@...e.hu,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
	amwang@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
	eric.dumazet@...il.com, gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com,
	daniel.lezcano@...e.fr, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
	alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter

On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 7:52 PM, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net> wrote:
> On 01/12/2012 03:38 PM, Will Drewry wrote:
>> Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet
>> Filter programs works and how it may be used.
>> Includes an example for x86 (32-bit).
>>
>> v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@...otime.net)
>>     - document use of tentative always-unprivileged
>>     - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64
>> v2: - move code to samples (corbet@....net)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
>> ---
>>  Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt |   94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  samples/Makefile                       |    2 +-
>>  samples/seccomp/Makefile               |   18 ++++++
>>  samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c          |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  4 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>>  create mode 100644 Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>>  create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/Makefile
>>  create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..2db8b89
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>> @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
>> +             Seccomp filtering
>> +             =================
>> +
>> +Introduction
>> +------------
>> +
>> +A large number of system calls are exposed to every userland process
>> +with many of them going unused for the entire lifetime of the process.
>> +As system calls change and mature, bugs are found and eradicated.  A
>> +certain subset of userland applications benefit by having a reduced set
>> +of available system calls.  The resulting set reduces the total kernel
>> +surface exposed to the application.  System call filtering is meant for
>> +use with those applications.
>> +
>> +Seccomp filtering provides a means for a process to specify a filter
>> +for incoming system calls.  The filter is expressed as a Berkeley Packet
>> +Filter (BPF) program, as with socket filters, except that the data
>> +operated on is the current user_regs_struct.  This allows for expressive
>> +filtering of system calls using the pre-existing system call ABI and
>> +using a filter program language with a long history of being exposed to
>> +userland.  Additionally, BPF makes it impossible for users of seccomp to
>> +fall prey to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks that are common
>> +in system call interposition frameworks because the evaluated data is
>> +solely register state just after system call entry.
>> +
>> +What it isn't
>> +-------------
>> +
>> +System call filtering isn't a sandbox.  It provides a clearly defined
>> +mechanism for minimizing the exposed kernel surface.  Beyond that,
>> +policy for logical behavior and information flow should be managed with
>> +a combinations of other system hardening techniques and, potentially, a
>
>     combination                                                         an
>
>> +LSM of your choosing.  Expressive, dynamic filters provide further options down
>> +this path (avoiding pathological sizes or selecting which of the multiplexed
>> +system calls in socketcall() is allowed, for instance) which could be
>> +construed, incorrectly, as a more complete sandboxing solution.
>> +
>> +Usage
>> +-----
>> +
>> +An additional seccomp mode is added, but they are not directly set by the
>> +consuming process.  The new mode, '2', is only available if
>> +CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER is set and enabled using prctl with the
>> +PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER argument.
>> +
>> +Interacting with seccomp filters is done using one prctl(2) call.
>> +
>> +PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER:
>> +     Allows the specification of a new filter using a BPF program.
>> +     The BPF program will be executed over a user_regs_struct data
>> +     reflecting system call time except with the system call number
>> +     resident in orig_[register].  To allow a system call, the size
>> +     of the data must be returned.  At present, all other return values
>> +     result in the system call being blocked, but it is recommended to
>> +     return 0 in those cases.  This will allow for future custom return
>> +     values to be introduced, if ever desired.
>> +
>> +     Usage:
>> +             prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, prog);
>> +
>> +     The 'prog' argument is a pointer to a struct sock_fprog which will
>> +     contain the filter program.  If the program is invalid, the call
>> +     will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
>
>                                        EINVAL.
> (I think)
>
>> +
>> +     The struct user_regs_struct the @prog will see is based on the
>> +     personality of the task at the time of this prctl call.  Additionally,
>> +     is_compat_task is also tracked for the @prog.  This means that once set
>> +     the calling task will have all of its system calls blocked if it
>> +     switches its system call ABI (via personality or other means).
>> +
>> +     If fork/clone and execve are allowed by @prog, any child processes will
>> +     be constrained to the same filters and syscal call ABI as the parent.
>
>                                               syscall
>
>> +
>> +     When called from an unprivileged process (lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN), the
>> +     "always_unprivileged" bit is enabled for the process.
>> +
>> +     Additionally, if prctl(2) is allowed by the attached filter,
>> +     additional filters may be layered on which will increase evaluation
>> +     time, but allow for further decreasing the attack surface during
>> +     execution of a process.
>> +
>> +The above call returns 0 on success and non-zero on error.
>> +
>> +Example
>> +-------
>> +
>> +samples/seccomp-bpf-example.c shows an example process that allows read from stdin,
>
>   samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c
>
>> +write to stdout/err, exit and signal returns for 32-bit x86.
>
>                  /stderr,
>

Thanks for the close reading! I've got another patchset mostly rolled
and I'll pull these in too.
will
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists