[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1326811122.2937.4.camel@localhost>
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 09:38:42 -0500
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To: "J. R. Okajima" <hooanon05@...oo.co.jp>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, w41ter@...il.com
Subject: Re: [GIT] Security updates for 3.3: SELinux
On Tue, 2012-01-17 at 23:28 +0900, J. R. Okajima wrote:
> James Morris:
> > Eric Paris (12):
> :::
> > capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
>
> After this commit, I am afraid access(2) on NFS may not work correctly.
> The scenario based upon my guess.
> - access(2) overrides the credentials.
> - calls inode_permission() -- ... -- generic_permission() --
> ns_capable().
> - while the old ns_capable() calls security_capable(current_cred()), the
> new ns_capable() calls has_ns_capability(current) --
> security_capable(__task_cred(t)).
>
> current_cred() returns current->cred which is effective (overridden)
> credentials, but __task_cred(current) returns current->real_cred (the
> NFSD's credential). And the overridden credentials by access(2) lost.
>
> Is my guess correct?
Linus please revert d2a7009f0bb03fa22ad08dd25472efa0568126b9
Your explanation seems plausible. I will review the rest and make sure
a similar problem was not introduced elsewhere.
-Eric
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists