[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20120118171210.GB16835@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2012 18:12:10 +0100
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@...il.com>
Cc: Indan Zupancic <indan@....nu>, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com, djm@...drot.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, segoon@...nwall.com,
rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org, avi@...hat.com,
penberg@...helsinki.fi, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, mingo@...e.hu,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
amwang@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@...il.com,
gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com, daniel.lezcano@...e.fr,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com,
Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? [was: Re:
[RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF]
On 01/18, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>
> On 01/17, Chris Evans wrote:
> >
> > 1) Tracee is compromised; executes fork() which is syscall that isn't allowed
> > 2) Tracee traps
> > 2b) Tracee could take a SIGKILL here
> > 3) Tracer looks at registers; bad syscall
> > 3b) Or tracee could take a SIGKILL here
> > 4) The only way to stop the bad syscall from executing is to rewrite
> > orig_eax (PTRACE_CONT + SIGKILL only kills the process after the
> > syscall has finished)
> > 5) Disaster: the tracee took a SIGKILL so any attempt to address it by
> > pid (such as PTRACE_SETREGS) fails.
> > 6) Syscall fork() executes; possible unsupervised process now running
> > since the tracer wasn't expecting the fork() to be allowed.
>
> As for fork() in particular, it can't succeed after SIGKILL.
>
> But I agree, probably it makes sense to change ptrace_stop() to check
> fatal_signal_pending() and do do_group_exit(SIGKILL) after it sleeps
> in TASK_TRACED. Or we can change tracehook_report_syscall_entry()
>
> - return 0;
> + return !fatal_signal_pending();
>
> (no, I do not literally mean the change above)
>
> Not only for security. The current behaviour sometime confuses the
> users. Debugger sends SIGKILL to the tracee and assumes it should
> die asap, but the tracee exits only after syscall.
Something like the patch below.
Oleg.
--- x/include/linux/tracehook.h
+++ x/include/linux/tracehook.h
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ struct linux_binprm;
/*
* ptrace report for syscall entry and exit looks identical.
*/
-static inline void ptrace_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int ptrace = current->ptrace;
if (!(ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
- return;
+ return 0;
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP | ((ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD) ? 0x80 : 0));
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static inline void ptrace_report_syscall
send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1);
current->exit_code = 0;
}
+
+ return fatal_signal_pending(current);
}
/**
@@ -96,8 +98,7 @@ static inline void ptrace_report_syscall
static inline __must_check int tracehook_report_syscall_entry(
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- ptrace_report_syscall(regs);
- return 0;
+ return ptrace_report_syscall(regs);
}
/**
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists