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Message-ID: <20120121090342.GD32134@elte.hu>
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2012 10:03:42 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Dan Ballard <dan@...dstab.net>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Stephen Wilson <wilsons@...rt.ca>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl: control functionality of /proc/pid/mem
* Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> @@ -702,6 +704,9 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
> struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
> struct mm_struct *mm;
>
> + if (sysctl_proc_pid_mem < 1)
> + return -EACCES;
This looks like an unprivileged user-space triggerable memory
leak DoS. The task reference is already acquired at that point.
See how easy it is to introduce bugs with potential security
side-effects, even when the intention is to increase security?
:-)
( Btw., this is why i generally prefer 'invariant' local
variable definition blocks that have no serious side effects -
it makes the flow more obvious. Local variables slip off the
eye rather often and don't register as 'real' code.)
Thanks,
Ingo
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