linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

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Date:	Sat, 28 Jan 2012 12:13:13 -0800
From:	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
To:	Cong Wang <amwang@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
	john.johansen@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
	coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
	djm@...drot.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	segoon@...nwall.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	scarybeasts@...il.com, avi@...hat.com, penberg@...helsinki.fi,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, luto@....edu, mingo@...e.hu,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
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	gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com, daniel.lezcano@...e.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
	alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, indan@....nu, mcgrathr@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF

On Sat, Jan 28, 2012 at 3:21 AM, Cong Wang <amwang@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-01-27 at 17:24 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
>> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
>> +       bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
>> +       select SECCOMP
>
> Is 'depends on SECCOMP' better?

Either way is fine for me.  I chose select so that SECCOMP_FILTER
wouldn't be hidden if SECCOMP was off when they hit the security menu.

>
>> +       help
>> +         This option provide support for limiting the accessibility
>> of
>
> s/provide/provides/
>
>> +         systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined
>> policy.
>
>
> s/systems/system/
>
>> +
>> +         System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using
>> +         a Berkeley Packet Filter program.  The program is attached
>> using
>
> s/the user using//
>
>> +         prctl(2).  For every system call the task makes, its number,
>> +         arguments, and other metadata will be evaluated by the
>> attached
>> +         filter program.  The result determines if the system call
>> may
>> +         may proceed or if the task should be terminated.
>
> One more "may"... and "be proceeded"
>
>> +
>> +         This behavior is meant to aid security-conscious software in
>> +         its ability to minimize the risk of running potentially
>> +         risky code.
>> +
>> +         See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
>> +
>
>
> Thanks.

Thanks!  Cleaned up, as recommended, and slightly reworded.  I'll
include the updates in the next salvo.
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