linux-kernel - Re: Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? [was: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF]

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <fc2e8d9f8394165e8f4acc1a2f10ffdd.squirrel@webmail.greenhost.nl>
Date:	Tue, 7 Feb 2012 12:45:53 +0100
From:	"Indan Zupancic" <indan@....nu>
To:	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:	"Chris Evans" <scarybeasts@...il.com>,
	"Andi Kleen" <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	"Jamie Lokier" <jamie@...reable.org>,
	"Andrew Lutomirski" <luto@....edu>,
	"Will Drewry" <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
	serge.hallyn@...onical.com, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	pmoore@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com, djm@...drot.org,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, segoon@...nwall.com,
	rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org, avi@...hat.com,
	penberg@...helsinki.fi, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, mingo@...e.hu,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, khilman@...com, borislav.petkov@....com,
	amwang@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@...il.com,
	dhowells@...hat.com, daniel.lezcano@...e.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, olofj@...omium.org,
	mhalcrow@...gle.com, dlaor@...hat.com,
	"Roland McGrath" <mcgrathr@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? [was: Re:
 [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF]

On Wed, January 18, 2012 18:12, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 01/18, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>>
>> On 01/17, Chris Evans wrote:
>> >
>> > 1) Tracee is compromised; executes fork() which is syscall that isn't allowed
>> > 2) Tracee traps
>> > 2b) Tracee could take a SIGKILL here
>> > 3) Tracer looks at registers; bad syscall
>> > 3b) Or tracee could take a SIGKILL here
>> > 4) The only way to stop the bad syscall from executing is to rewrite
>> > orig_eax (PTRACE_CONT + SIGKILL only kills the process after the
>> > syscall has finished)
>> > 5) Disaster: the tracee took a SIGKILL so any attempt to address it by
>> > pid (such as PTRACE_SETREGS) fails.
>> > 6) Syscall fork() executes; possible unsupervised process now running
>> > since the tracer wasn't expecting the fork() to be allowed.
>>
>> As for fork() in particular, it can't succeed after SIGKILL.
>>
>> But I agree, probably it makes sense to change ptrace_stop() to check
>> fatal_signal_pending() and do do_group_exit(SIGKILL) after it sleeps
>> in TASK_TRACED. Or we can change tracehook_report_syscall_entry()
>>
>> 	-	return 0;
>> 	+	return !fatal_signal_pending();
>>
>> (no, I do not literally mean the change above)
>>
>> Not only for security. The current behaviour sometime confuses the
>> users. Debugger sends SIGKILL to the tracee and assumes it should
>> die asap, but the tracee exits only after syscall.
>
> Something like the patch below.
>
> Oleg.
>
> --- x/include/linux/tracehook.h
> +++ x/include/linux/tracehook.h
> @@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ struct linux_binprm;
>  /*
>   * ptrace report for syscall entry and exit looks identical.
>   */
> -static inline void ptrace_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
>  	int ptrace = current->ptrace;
>
>  	if (!(ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
> -		return;
> +		return 0;
>
>  	ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP | ((ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD) ? 0x80 : 0));
>
> @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static inline void ptrace_report_syscall
>  		send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1);
>  		current->exit_code = 0;
>  	}
> +
> +	return fatal_signal_pending(current);
>  }
>
>  /**
> @@ -96,8 +98,7 @@ static inline void ptrace_report_syscall
>  static inline __must_check int tracehook_report_syscall_entry(
>  	struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
> -	ptrace_report_syscall(regs);
> -	return 0;
> +	return ptrace_report_syscall(regs);
>  }
>

Tested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@....nu>

Tested on 32-bit x86. It behaves as expected, please apply.

Greetings,

Indan


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/