| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20120215133505.GA3659@Krystal>
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 08:35:06 -0500
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@...ah.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)
* Eric Dumazet (eric.dumazet@...il.com) wrote:
> Le mardi 14 février 2012 à 23:10 -0500, Mathieu Desnoyers a écrit :
> > The proc file /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently
> > by user-space processes. If two (or more) user-space processes
> > concurrently read boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race
> > can occur making boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole
> > point of the boot id is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this
> > by protecting this operation with a mutex, and introduce a
> > boot_id_generated flag, along with appropriate memory barriers, to let
> > the fast-path know if the boot ID has been generated without having to
> > hold the mutex.
> >
> > I propose this approach rather than setting it up within an initcall(),
> > because letting execution randomness add to entropy before populating
> > the boot id seems to be a wanted property. Also, populating it lazily
> > rather than at boot time only makes the performance hit be taken when
> > boot_id is being read.
> >
> >
> > Q: Why are these memory barriers required ? Aren't the mutexes already
> > dealing with ordering ?
> >
> > The need for memory barriers is a consequence of letting the fast-path
> > run without holding this mutex.
> >
> > Here is the race dealt with by the smp_rmb()/smp_wmb(). I'm showing the
> > result of reversed write order here:
> >
> > CPU A CPU B
> >
> > Load boot_id_generated
> > (test -> false)
> > mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex)
> > (implied memory barrier
> > with acquire semantic)
> > Load boot_id_generated again
> > (test -> false)
> > boot_id_generated = 1
> > (both the compiler and
> > CPU are free to reorder
> > the boot_id_generated
> > store before uuid stores)
> > Load boot_id_generated
> > (test -> true)
> > Load uuid content
> > (races with generate_random_uuid:
> > result either 0 or corrupted)
> > Return corrupted uuid.
> > generate_random_uuid(uuid)
> > mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex)
> >
> > I prefer not requiring the fast-path to take a mutex, because this
> > would transform a read-mostly operation into an operation that
> > requires cache-line exchanges (the mutex). However, if we want the
> > fast-path to be mutex-free, we need to enforce order with
> > memory barriers: smp_rmb on the read-side, smp_wmb on the
> > update-side. Failure to do so leads to the race shown above, where
> > a corrupted boot_id can be returned.
> >
> >
> > * Changelog since v1:
> > - boot_id_mutex is now declared within the proc_do_uuid scope.
> > - added explanation for memory barriers.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
> > CC: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
> > CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>
> > CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@...ah.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/char/random.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
> > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > Index: linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> > ===================================================================
> > --- linux-2.6-lttng.orig/drivers/char/random.c
> > +++ linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> > @@ -1244,16 +1244,30 @@ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
> > static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
> > void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > {
> > + static int boot_id_generated;
> > + static DEFINE_MUTEX(boot_id_mutex);
> > ctl_table fake_table;
> > unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
> >
> > uuid = table->data;
> > if (!uuid) {
> > uuid = tmp_uuid;
> > - uuid[8] = 0;
> > - }
> > - if (uuid[8] == 0)
> > generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> > + } else {
> > + if (unlikely(!ACCESS_ONCE(boot_id_generated))) {
> > + mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex);
> > + if (!boot_id_generated) {
> > + generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> > + /* Store uuid before boot_id_generated. */
> > + smp_wmb();
> > + boot_id_generated = 1;
> > + }
> > + mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Load boot_id_generated before uuid */
> > + smp_rmb();
> > + }
> > + }
> >
> > sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
> >
> >
>
> This seems overly complex to me.
>
> I doubt this is performance critical path ?
Fair point, I don't see many use-cases where an application would like
to get the boot_id value (which stays constant over an entire kernel
execution) very frequently, unlike /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.
>
> What about a basic patch like :
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 54ca8b2..af6040d 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1260,11 +1260,15 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
> uuid = table->data;
> if (!uuid) {
> uuid = tmp_uuid;
> - uuid[8] = 0;
> - }
> - if (uuid[8] == 0)
> generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> + } else {
> + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
>
> + spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
> + if (!uuid[8])
> + generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> + spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
That would make sense, as long as we're OK about turning a read-mostly
operation into a fully serialized operation that requires to exchange
the lock between processor cache-lines. But as you point out, it should
be fairly unfrequently used.
Any particular reason to use a spin lock rather than a mutex ? I did put
a mutex in my implementation assuming that it would be a little more
RT-friendly.
Thanks,
Mathieu
> + }
> sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
>
> fake_table.data = buf;
>
>
>
--
Mathieu Desnoyers
Operating System Efficiency R&D Consultant
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists