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Message-ID: <20120316073722.GI3163@mwanda>
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 10:37:22 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To: KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>
Cc: "gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"ohering@...e.com" <ohering@...e.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"virtualization@...ts.osdl.org" <virtualization@...ts.osdl.org>,
Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
"devel@...uxdriverproject.org" <devel@...uxdriverproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Drivers: hv: Support the newly introduced KVP
messages in the driver
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 10:18:58AM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 05:48:43PM -0700, K. Y. Srinivasan wrote:
> > > > /*
> > > > * The windows host expects the key/value pair to be encoded
> > > > * in utf16.
> > > > */
> > > > keylen = utf8s_to_utf16s(key_name, strlen(key_name),
> > > UTF16_HOST_ENDIAN,
> > > > - (wchar_t *) kvp_data->data.key,
> > > > + (wchar_t *) kvp_data->key,
> > > > HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE / 2);
> > > > - kvp_data->data.key_size = 2*(keylen + 1); /* utf16 encoding */
> > > > + kvp_data->key_size = 2*(keylen + 1); /* utf16 encoding */
> > > > +
> > >
> > > I feel like a jerk for asking this, but is the output length correct
> > > here? It seems like we could go over again. Also utf8s_to_utf16s()
> > > can return negative error codes, why do we ignore those?
> >
> > We are returning the strings back to the host here. There are checks elsewhere
> > in the code to ensure that all strings we return to the host can be accommodated
> > in the available space. For the most part these are strings that the host gave us in the
> > first place that have already been validated. Furthermore, there are checks on the
> > host side to ensure that the returned size parameters are consistent with the protocol
> > definitions for the key value pair. For instance let us say somehow we got into a
> > situation where the converted utf16 string occupied the entire MAX sized array
> > without any room for the terminating character and we set the length parameter
> > to 2 more than the MAX value as this code would do. The host would simply discard the
> > message as an illegal message. This would be more appropriate than sending a
> > truncated key or value.
> >
>
> Uh... Looking at it again, this code is clearly off by one. If
> we're not going to hit the limit, then we're not going to truncate,
> so that's not a concern. Let's just use the correct limit here.
>
Another option of course would be to add a test after the
conversion.
if (keylen == HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE / 2)
return -EINVAL;
What I'm saying is that I audit a lot of code for buffer overflows,
and I don't want to see an off by one and then I have to audit where
the string come from and audit where it's going.
If it's corrupts memory then I fix the bug and I can list it under
my achievements in my weekly status report. If it's wrong but it
doesn't corrupt memory, it's just a complete waste of my time and it
makes me really cross.
regards,
dan carpenter
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