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Message-Id: <20120319151507.93bab32a.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2012 15:15:07 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Matt Helsley <matthltc@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] c/r: prctl: Add ability to set new
mm_struct::exe_file
On Sat, 17 Mar 2012 00:55:57 +0400
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org> wrote:
> When we do restore we would like to have a way to setup
> a former mm_struct::exe_file so that /proc/pid/exe would
> point to the original executable file a process had at
> checkpoint time.
>
> For this the PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE code is introduced.
> This option takes a file descriptor which will be
> set as a source for new /proc/$pid/exe symlink.
>
> Note it allows to change /proc/$pid/exe iif there
> are no VM_EXECUTABLE vmas present for current process,
> simply because this feature is a special to C/R
> and mm::num_exe_file_vmas become meaningless after
> that.
>
> Also this action is one-shot only. For security reason
> we don't allow to change the symlink several times.
What is this mysterious "security reason"?
>
> ...
>
> +static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
> +{
> + struct file *exe_file;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> + int err;
> +
> + /*
> + * Setting new mm::exe_file is only allowed
> + * when no VM_EXECUTABLE vma's left. So make
> + * a fast test first.
> + */
> + if (mm->num_exe_file_vmas)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + exe_file = fget(fd);
> + if (!exe_file)
> + return -EBADF;
> +
> + dentry = exe_file->f_path.dentry;
> +
> + /*
> + * Because the original mm->exe_file
> + * points to executable file, make sure
> + * this one is executable as well to not
> + * break an overall picture.
> + */
> + err = -EACCES;
> + if (!S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
> + exe_file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + err = inode_permission(dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
> + if (err)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + /*
> + * For security reason changing mm->exe_file
> + * is one-shot action.
> + */
It should be explained here also. The comment is pretty useless - if
we don't tell people what this "security reason" is, how can future
developers be sure that they aren't violating it?
> + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + if (likely(!mm->exe_file))
> + set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe_file);
> + else
> + err = -EBUSY;
> + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> +exit:
> + fput(exe_file);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
> {
>
> ...
>
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