[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <5076094.qra9nCCzS0@sifl>
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2012 18:46:02 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
libseccomp-discuss@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ANN: libseccomp
On Monday, April 09, 2012 04:51:30 PM Will Drewry wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, April 09, 2012 12:16:30 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> >> > With the seccomp patches finally stabilizing a bit, it seems like now
> >> > is a
> >> > good time to announce libseccomp: a library designed to make it easier
> >> > to
> >> > create complex, architecture independent seccomp filters.
> >> >
> >> > * http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
> >> > * git clone git://git.code.sf.net/p/libseccomp/libseccomp
> >>
> >> This looks really great; nice work!
>
> Agreed -- this is great to see!
Not as much as the actual kernel support :)
> >> I see that the arch check happens during _gen_bpf_build_bpf(), which
> >> is excellent. Do you have any thoughts about including a call to
> >> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) by default as well?
> >
> > That is a good question, and I guess it comes down to another question of
> > if anyone would want to use seccomp without NO_NEW_PRIVS. If the answer
> > is no then I'm comfortable adding it into the seccomp_load() function;
> > however, if the answer is yes we might want to do something different.
> >
> > I haven't given much thought to this yet, so if you or anyone else feels
> > strongly about the issue - either pro or con - I'd appreciate hearing the
> > argument.
>
> I guess the question is if there is an expectation that this library
> be used with something like lxc, where a whole, functional system with
> suid/fcaps binaries is contained. In that world, it may not be
> desirable to set the nnp bit. The same is true if, for some reason,
> the init task was to set a system-wide filter.
>
> Most likely, default use of nnp is probably "the right thing", but
> it'd be nice to be able to annotate when you really want to allow
> privileged contexts to set filters without nnp.
Okay, that seems reasonable: default to NO_NEW_PRIVS, but provide an override
mechanism.
I've been wanting a mechanism/API for tweaking some of the default library
parameters for the past few weeks, this is likely the last bit of motivation I
need to start working on this. I'll look into it once the license issue is
sorted.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists