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Message-ID: <20120410223758.GL24857@moon>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2012 02:37:58 +0400
From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Andrey Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Matt Helsley <matthltc@...ibm.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu,
Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: + syscalls-x86-add-__nr_kcmp-syscall-v8.patch added to -mm tree
On Mon, Apr 09, 2012 at 04:22:38PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > The obfuscation logic was done with great help from hpa@. And the main
> > idea was to have ordered results after obfuscation. Per-type noise increase
> > randomization of results. So Andrew, I actually dont know what to add
> > here. We don't want to provide kernel order back to user-space in
> > naked manner.
> >
>
> The obfuscation logic is to provide a 1:1 mapping but which doesn't
> preserve ordering, thereby avoid leaking information of kernel pointers
> to user space.
>
OK, Peter, would the following comment bring light on the obfuscation
procedure?
---
Add a comment on kcmp obfuscation method
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
---
kernel/kcmp.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
Index: linux-2.6.git/kernel/kcmp.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.git.orig/kernel/kcmp.c
+++ linux-2.6.git/kernel/kcmp.c
@@ -17,6 +17,17 @@
* reasons, still the comparison results should be suitable for
* sorting. Thus, we obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare
* the production instead.
+ *
+ * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First -- we use xor on
+ * kernel pointer with random value, which puts pointer into
+ * a new position in reordered space. Second -- we multiply
+ * the xor production with big odd random number to permute
+ * bits even more (the oddity is important here, it allow
+ * us to have meaningful production even if multiplicants
+ * are big numbers).
+ *
+ * Note also the obfuscation itself is invisible to user-space
+ * and if needed it can be changed to any suitable scheme.
*/
static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
--
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