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Message-ID: <9270063.OgsgoBpmh0@sifl>
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 16:14:43 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
libseccomp-discuss@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ANN: libseccomp
On Monday, April 09, 2012 06:46:02 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Monday, April 09, 2012 04:51:30 PM Will Drewry wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > > On Monday, April 09, 2012 12:16:30 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > >> I see that the arch check happens during _gen_bpf_build_bpf(), which
> > >> is excellent. Do you have any thoughts about including a call to
> > >> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) by default as well?
> > >
> > > That is a good question, and I guess it comes down to another question
> > > of if anyone would want to use seccomp without NO_NEW_PRIVS. If the
> > > answer is no then I'm comfortable adding it into the seccomp_load()
> > > function; however, if the answer is yes we might want to do something
> > > different.
> > >
> > > I haven't given much thought to this yet, so if you or anyone else feels
> > > strongly about the issue - either pro or con - I'd appreciate hearing
> > > the argument.
> >
> > I guess the question is if there is an expectation that this library
> > be used with something like lxc, where a whole, functional system with
> > suid/fcaps binaries is contained. In that world, it may not be
> > desirable to set the nnp bit. The same is true if, for some reason,
> > the init task was to set a system-wide filter.
> >
> > Most likely, default use of nnp is probably "the right thing", but
> > it'd be nice to be able to annotate when you really want to allow
> > privileged contexts to set filters without nnp.
>
> Okay, that seems reasonable: default to NO_NEW_PRIVS, but provide an
> override mechanism.
>
> I've been wanting a mechanism/API for tweaking some of the default library
> parameters for the past few weeks, this is likely the last bit of motivation
> I need to start working on this. I'll look into it once the license issue
> is sorted.
A quick update - I just added support for setting NO_NEW_PRIVS when loading
the seccomp filter into the kernel. By default libseccomp attempts to set
NO_NEW_PRIVS but does not fail if prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) returns with an error;
however, both the attempt to set NO_NEW_PRIVS and the fact that libseccomp
does not fail on error are configurable via the application if you don't like
the defaults for your particular use case.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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