linux-kernel - Re: c/r: broken locking when executing map

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Message-ID: <20120506202132.GA6570@albatros>
Date:	Mon, 7 May 2012 00:21:32 +0400
From:	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To:	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
Cc:	Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@...il.com>, khlebnikov@...nvz.org,
	xemul@...allels.com, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: c/r: broken locking when executing map_files

On Sat, May 05, 2012 at 23:32 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> On Sat, May 05, 2012 at 10:53:06PM +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> > On Sat, May 05, 2012 at 10:20:51PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > > > -	if (lock_trace(task))
> > > > +	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> > > 
> > > Probably it will be better to change mutex_lock_killable() to
> > > mutex_lock_killable_nested() inside of lock_trace() instead of this change?
> > > It would keep the race-free check.
> > 
> > Yup, if I'm not missing something SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING should do the trick
> > for us. I'll test and report.
> 
> Hmm, this doesn't work well, the mutex remanins killable so when one does

Does it show circular locking?  It shouldn't block if it uses
mutex_lock+mutex_lock_nested.

>  | [root@...tune ~]# /proc/self/map_files/400000-419000
> 
> it sleeps forever until killed, which is not good I think. Vasiliy, could
> you remind me what exactly is problem if we use unlocked ptrace_may_access
> here?

There is a race between ptrace_may_access() and dname_to_vma_addr().
The target task may do exec() between these calls and
dname_to_vma_addr() will be called against a privileged task.  This may
lead to a leak of task maps.

-- 
Vasily Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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