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Message-ID: <4FA79848.2030308@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 05:39:20 -0400
From: Ric Wheeler <rwheeler@...hat.com>
To: linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@...bao.com>,
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>, Ted.Ts'o.tytso@....edu,
Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
Lukas Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger@...mcloud.com>,
Szabolcs Szakacsits <szaka@...era.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] ext4: add expose_stale_data flag in fallocate
On 05/06/2012 11:44 PM, Zheng Liu wrote:
> On Thu, May 03, 2012 at 06:09:48AM -0400, Ric Wheeler wrote:
>> On 05/03/2012 12:14 AM, Zheng Liu wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> Here is the v2 of FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE in fallocate. Now no new flag is
>>> added into vfs in order to reduce the impacts and avoid a huge security hole.
>>> The application cannot call fallocate with a new flag to create an unwritten
>>> extent. It needs to call ioctl to enable/disable this feature. Meanwhile, in
>>> ioctl, filesystem will check CAP_SYS_RAWIO to ensure that the user has a
>>> privilege to switch on/off it. Currently, I only implement it in ext4.
>> Hi Zheng,
>>
>> I thought that we had pretty much decided to try and fix the ext4
>> performance impact, not pursue this?
> Hi Ric,
>
> Sorry for the delay reply. I fully agree with you about trying to improve the
> ext4 performance. But maybe it is useful for someone who quite needs to
> avoid this overhead and can afford this huge security hole. Just leave
> this patch in the mailing list. :-)
>
> Regards,
> Zheng
The problem is that when you put out a glaring security hole and label it a
"performance" patch, people will use it who don't understand.
I strongly disagree with the patch, we need to fix the performance issue first
*before* looking at exposing stale data to users.
Thanks,
Ric
>
>>> Even though I try to reduce its impact, this feature still brings a security
>>> hole. So the application must ensure that it initializes an unwritten extent
>>> by itself before reading it, and it is used in a limited environment.
>>>
>>> v1 -> v2:
>>> * remove FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE flag in vfs
>>> * add 'i_expose_stale_data' in ext4 to enable/disable it
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Zheng
>>>
>>> From 530045b4a1f75df5afd40c0e20c89917f97d7d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> From: Zheng Liu<wenqing.lz@...bao.com>
>>> Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 11:21:44 +0800
>>> Subject: [RFC][PATCH v2] ext4: add expose_stale_data flag in fallocate
>>>
>>> We can use fallocate to preallocate sequential blocks. But these extents are
>>> uninitialized. So when the application does a write, filesystem will
>>> initialized these unwritten extents and it brings a huge overhead in some
>>> cases.
>>>
>>> This patch adds a new flag in inode to indicate whether initialize an unwritten
>>> extent or not. This flag is enable/disable within ioctl that switch on/off this
>>> feature. The application must call ioctl to enable this feature before it tries
>>> to preallocate some blocks.
>>>
>>> Obviously, this feature brings a huge security hole. The application must
>>> guarantee to initialize this file by itself before reading it at the same
>>> offset. So the application *MUST* use it carefully.
>>>
>>> CC: Ric Wheeler<rwheeler@...hat.com>
>>> CC: Eric Sandeen<sandeen@...hat.com>
>>> CC: Ted Ts'o tytso@....edu>
>>> CC: Dave Chinner<david@...morbit.com>
>>> CC: Lukas Czerner<lczerner@...hat.com>
>>> CC: Andreas Dilger<adilger@...mcloud.com>
>>> CC: Szabolcs Szakacsits<szaka@...era.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu<wenqing.lz@...bao.com>
>>> ---
>>> fs/ext4/ext4.h | 5 +++++
>>> fs/ext4/extents.c | 6 +++++-
>>> fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> fs/ext4/super.c | 1 +
>>> 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
>>> index 0e01e90..f56caf0 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
>>> +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
>>> @@ -593,6 +593,8 @@ enum {
>>> #define EXT4_IOC_ALLOC_DA_BLKS _IO('f', 12)
>>> #define EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT _IOWR('f', 15, struct move_extent)
>>> #define EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS _IOW('f', 16, __u64)
>>> +#define EXT4_IOC_GET_EXPOSE_STALE _IOR('f', 17, int)
>>> +#define EXT4_IOC_SET_EXPOSE_STALE _IOW('f', 18, int)
>>>
>>> #if defined(__KERNEL__)&& defined(CONFIG_COMPAT)
>>> /*
>>> @@ -908,6 +910,9 @@ struct ext4_inode_info {
>>> */
>>> tid_t i_sync_tid;
>>> tid_t i_datasync_tid;
>>> +
>>> + /* expose stale data in creating a new extent */
>>> + int i_expose_stale_data;
>>> };
>>>
>>> /*
>>> diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c
>>> index abcdeab..14f54f1 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
>>> +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
>>> @@ -4269,6 +4269,7 @@ static void ext4_falloc_update_inode(struct inode *inode,
>>> long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
>>> {
>>> struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
>>> + struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
>>> handle_t *handle;
>>> loff_t new_size;
>>> unsigned int max_blocks;
>>> @@ -4312,7 +4313,10 @@ long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
>>> trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks, ret);
>>> return ret;
>>> }
>>> - flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNINIT_EXT;
>>> + if (ei->i_expose_stale_data)
>>> + flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE;
>>> + else
>>> + flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNINIT_EXT;
>>> if (mode& FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
>>> flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
>>> /*
>>> diff --git a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
>>> index 6eee255..a37db8e 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
>>> +++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
>>> @@ -432,6 +432,47 @@ resizefs_out:
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + case EXT4_IOC_GET_EXPOSE_STALE: {
>>> + int enable;
>>> +
>>> + /* security check */
>>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * currently only extent-based files support (pre)allocate with
>>> + * EXPOSE_STALE_DATA flag
>>> + */
>>> + if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
>>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>> +
>>> + enable = ei->i_expose_stale_data;
>>> +
>>> + return put_user(enable, (int __user *) arg);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + case EXT4_IOC_SET_EXPOSE_STALE: {
>>> + int enable;
>>> +
>>> + /* security check */
>>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * currently only extent-based files support (pre)allocate with
>>> + * EXPOSE_STALE_DATA flag
>>> + */
>>> + if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
>>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>> +
>>> + if (get_user(enable, (int __user *) arg))
>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> + ei->i_expose_stale_data = enable;
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> default:
>>> return -ENOTTY;
>>> }
>>> @@ -495,6 +536,8 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>>> case EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT:
>>> case FITRIM:
>>> case EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS:
>>> + case EXT4_IOC_GET_EXPOSE_STALE:
>>> + case EXT4_IOC_SET_EXPOSE_STALE:
>>> break;
>>> default:
>>> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
>>> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
>>> index e1fb1d5..6de2db0 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ext4/super.c
>>> +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
>>> @@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
>>> ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
>>> atomic_set(&ei->i_ioend_count, 0);
>>> atomic_set(&ei->i_aiodio_unwritten, 0);
>>> + ei->i_expose_stale_data = 0;
>>>
>>> return&ei->vfs_inode;
>>> }
--
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