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Message-ID: <20120514171928.GA21943@www.outflux.net>
Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 10:19:28 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
When checking capabilities, the question we want to be asking is "does
current() have the capability in the child's namespace?"
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index afb04cb..7ba673b 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL:
if (!task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
!ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ !ns_capable(task_user_ns(child), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = -EPERM;
break;
case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(child), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = -EPERM;
break;
case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
--
1.7.0.4
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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