| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20120521195255.5b54f707@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 19:52:55 +0100 From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> To: ivo.welch@...il.com Cc: ivo.welch@...erson.ucla.edu, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: the easy way to sandbox? On Mon, 21 May 2012 09:28:13 -0700 ivo welch <ivo.welch@...erson.ucla.edu> wrote: > Suggestion: introduce a system call that eliminates access to all > real file systems for the current process. the only permissible > interaction would be stdin, stdout, and stderr. > > this would make it very simple to write a sandboxed safe fcgi script. No it wouldn't - because of things like ptrace. Sandboxing done right is *hard*. SELinux and the other security setups can do it. Containers can do interesting stuff in this space. Probably the distros sometimes need to package the tools for it better. Take a look at some of the cloud service code people have published. Alan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists