linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure

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Message-ID: <CAObL_7GSNbgceHQpNx3fbiCbV5u-_vJJO5cptwVCK34W7wFH5Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 24 May 2012 17:26:54 -0700
From:	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrathr@...gle.com, indan@....nu,
	netdev@...isplace.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com,
	oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net,
	tglx@...utronix.de, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org,
	coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call

On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 4:56 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> On 05/24/2012 04:43 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> IMO the behavior should change.  Alternatively, a post-ptrace syscall
>> should have to pass the *tracer's* seccomp filter, but that seems
>> overcomplicated and confusing.
>>
>> OTOH, allowing ptrace in a seccomp filter is asking for trouble anyway
>> -- if you can ptrace something outside the sandbox, you've escaped.
>>
>
> This is my suggestion: if there is demand, make it possible to install a
> *second* seccomp filter program which is run on the result of the
> ptrace.  I.e.:
>
> Untraced:       process -> seccomp1 -> kernel
>
> Traced:         process -> seccomp1 -> ptrace -> seccomp2 -> kernel

Just to clarify: are you suggesting that, for now, the traced behavior
should be:

process -> seccomp -> ptrace -> kernel?

If so, I think the man page or something should have a big fat warning
that seccomp filters should *never* allow ptrace (even PTRACE_TRACEME)
unless they fully understand the issue.

In any case, I think that the UML interaction is missing the point.
UML will *emulate* the seccomp filter.  If it chooses to use host
seccomp filters for some business, that's its business.

--Andy
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