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Message-ID: <8762b6k3nh.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 09:53:30 +0930
From: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
To: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, kyle@...artin.ca,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing
On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 09:38:43 -0400, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 3, 2012 at 9:16 PM, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au> wrote:
> > Mangling a module after it is signed is very odd, and odd things aren't
> > nice for security features. That's how we got here; I'm trying to move
> > the oddness out of the verification path.
>
> It's unfortunate, yes. The biggest case I can think of is splitting
> the debug symbols out of the modules after they are built (David might
> have other cases). Perhaps we could upstream that as well and
> organize it such that the modules are built, split for debuginfo, and
> then signed?
That was my original suggestion. Just prepare all the module variants
at build time, and sign them all.
See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/12/10/16
Cheers,
Rusty.
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