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Message-ID: <1338896342.4044.117.camel@falcor>
Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 07:39:02 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, kyle@...artin.ca,
dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
Tim Abbott <tabbott@...lice.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing
On Tue, 2012-06-05 at 10:35 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> On Mon, 04 Jun 2012 08:47:51 -0400, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2012-06-04 at 11:01 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> > > On Fri, 25 May 2012 16:42:19 +0100, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Rusty,
> > > >
> > > > If you prefer to have userspace extract the module signature and pass it in
> > > > uargs, here's a tree that will do that:
> > > >
> > > > http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-modsign.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/modsign-uarg
> > >
> > > OK, there's merit in this approach: it certainly moves the argument
> > > about how to encode the signature out of my backyard :)
> > >
> > > Should we just bite the bullet and create a new syscall:
> > >
> > > SYSCALL_DEFINE5(init_module2, void __user *, umod,
> > > unsigned long, len, const char __user *, uargs,
> > > unsigned int, siglen, const char __user *, sig)
> > >
> > > But I'm easily swayed if you prefer the current approach.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Rusty.
> >
> > If you're really considering creating a new syscall, then perhaps this
> > discussion should include passing the file descriptor instead of a
> > buffer and signature. As I said https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/25/261, I
> > don't know the historical reasons for passing a buffer instead of the
> > file descriptor itself. If the file descriptor was passed, it would
> > allow IMA-appraisal, which is in the process of being upstreamed, to
> > verify and enforce file data and metadata integrity like on the other
> > hooks open, execve, and mmap.
>
> It's flexible. Compressed modules, for example. And who knew if we
> would be runtime generating modules? But I don't think even the ksplice
> guys generate modules on the fly for insertion.
>
> modprobe has --force-vermagic and --force-modversion, but frankly that
> could be replaced by a single "force" flag handed to the kernel.
>
> If there's real benefit, it could be done. Do we still want a separate
> signature blob?
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE5(init_module_fd,
> int, fd,
> unsigned int, flags,
> const char *__user *, uargs,
> unsigned int, siglen,
> const char __user *, sig);
As the signature would be stored as an extended attribute, we wouldn't
need to pass it. Unfortunately not all filesystems have xattr support,
nor do all of the package installation mechanims. The benefit of
storing the signature as an extended attribute, however, is that there
is a consistent mechanism for verifying file data integrity for all
files, not only ELF.
Mimi
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