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Message-ID: <1339094834.21398.4.camel@key-ThinkPad-W510>
Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 13:47:14 -0500
From: Kent Yoder <key@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, m.selhorst@...rix.com,
safford@...ibm.com, key@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver
Move the tpm_get_random api from the trusted keys code into the TPM
device driver itself so that other callers can make use of it. Also,
change the api slightly so that the number of bytes read is returned in
the call, since the TPM command can potentially return fewer bytes than
requested.
Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder <key@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tpm.h | 4 +++
security/keys/trusted.c | 47 ++++++++--------------------------------
4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index ad7c732..8c74b24 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -31,12 +31,6 @@
#include "tpm.h"
-enum tpm_const {
- TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */
- TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096,
- TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 256,
-};
-
enum tpm_duration {
TPM_SHORT = 0,
TPM_MEDIUM = 1,
@@ -482,6 +476,7 @@ static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193)
#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM cpu_to_be32(70)
static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
@@ -1318,6 +1313,52 @@ int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE 18
+static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(14),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
+};
+
+/**
+ * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
+ * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
+ * @max: on input, the max number of bytes to write to @out, on output
+ * this is set to the actual number of bytes written to @out
+ *
+ * Note that @max will be capped at TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA bytes.
+ */
+int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t *max)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+ u32 num_bytes = min_t(u32, *max, TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA);
+ int err;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!num_bytes)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
+
+ err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
+ TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
+ "attempting get random");
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ *max = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data_len);
+ memcpy(out, tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data, *max);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
+
/* In case vendor provided release function, call it too.*/
void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *chip)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index b1c5280..610fe42 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
+enum tpm_const {
+ TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */
+ TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096,
+ TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 256,
+};
+
enum tpm_timeout {
TPM_TIMEOUT = 5, /* msecs */
};
@@ -269,6 +275,21 @@ struct tpm_pcrextend_in {
u8 hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
}__attribute__((packed));
+/* 128 bytes is an arbitrary cap. This could be as large as TPM_BUFSIZE - 18
+ * bytes, but 128 is still a relatively large number of random bytes and
+ * anything much bigger causes users of struct tpm_cmd_t to start getting
+ * compiler warnings about stack frame size. */
+#define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA 128
+
+struct tpm_getrandom_out {
+ __be32 rng_data_len;
+ u8 rng_data[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_getrandom_in {
+ __be32 num_bytes;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
typedef union {
struct tpm_getcap_params_out getcap_out;
struct tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out;
@@ -277,6 +298,8 @@ typedef union {
struct tpm_pcrread_in pcrread_in;
struct tpm_pcrread_out pcrread_out;
struct tpm_pcrextend_in pcrextend_in;
+ struct tpm_getrandom_in getrandom_in;
+ struct tpm_getrandom_out getrandom_out;
} tpm_cmd_params;
struct tpm_cmd_t {
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index fdc718a..d5b2f2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
+extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t *max);
#else
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
return -ENODEV;
@@ -42,5 +43,8 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
return -ENODEV;
}
+static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t *max) {
+ return -ENODEV;
+}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2d5d041..48a9eabc 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -369,38 +369,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
}
/*
- * get a random value from TPM
- */
-static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
-{
- int ret;
-
- INIT_BUF(tb);
- store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
- store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
- store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
- store32(tb, len);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
- if (!ret)
- memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
- struct tpm_buf *tb;
- int ret;
-
- tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tb)
- return -ENOMEM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
-
- kfree(tb);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
*
* Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
@@ -409,11 +377,12 @@ static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
{
unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, &digest_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
@@ -427,9 +396,10 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
{
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ size_t nonce_size = TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, &nonce_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -500,6 +470,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t pcrsize;
uint32_t datsize;
+ size_t nonce_size = TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
int sealinfosize;
int encdatasize;
int storedsize;
@@ -524,7 +495,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, &nonce_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -618,6 +589,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
unsigned char cont = 0;
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t keyhndl;
+ size_t nonce_size = TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
int ret;
/* sessions for unsealing key and data */
@@ -634,7 +606,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, &nonce_size);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -974,7 +946,8 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
break;
case Opt_new:
- ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key,
+ &payload->key_len);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
--
1.7.5.4
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