linux-kernel - Re: Fork bomb limitation in memcg WAS: Re: [PATCH 00/11] kmem controller for memcg: stripped down version

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Date:	Wed, 27 Jun 2012 14:35:47 +0200
From:	Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>
To:	Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, devel@...nvz.org,
	kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
	Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...aro.org>,
	Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@...y.org>,
	Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
	Kir Kolyshkin <kir@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: Fork bomb limitation in memcg WAS: Re: [PATCH 00/11] kmem
 controller for memcg: stripped down version

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 04:28:14PM +0400, Glauber Costa wrote:
> On 06/27/2012 04:29 PM, Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 01:29:04PM +0400, Glauber Costa wrote:
> >> On 06/27/2012 01:55 AM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >>>> I can't speak for everybody here, but AFAIK, tracking the stack through
> >>>> the memory it used, therefore using my proposed kmem controller, was an
> >>>> idea that good quite a bit of traction with the memcg/memory people.
> >>>> So here you have something that people already asked a lot for, in a
> >>>> shape and interface that seem to be acceptable.
> >>>
> >>> mm, maybe.  Kernel developers tend to look at code from the point of
> >>> view "does it work as designed", "is it clean", "is it efficient", "do
> >>> I understand it", etc.  We often forget to step back and really
> >>> consider whether or not it should be merged at all.
> >>>
> >>> I mean, unless the code is an explicit simplification, we should have
> >>> a very strong bias towards "don't merge".
> >>
> >> Well, simplifications are welcome - this series itself was
> >> simplified beyond what I thought initially possible through the
> >> valuable comments
> >> of other people.
> >>
> >> But of course, this adds more complexity to the kernel as a whole.
> >> And this is true to every single new feature we may add, now or in
> >> the
> >> future.
> >>
> >> What I can tell you about this particular one, is that the justification
> >> for it doesn't come out of nowhere, but from a rather real use case that
> >> we support and maintain in OpenVZ and our line of products for years.
> > 
> > Right and we really need a solution to protect against forkbombs in LXC.
> Small correction: In containers. LXC is not the only one out there =p

Sure. I was just speaking for the specific project I'm working on :)
But I'm definetly interested in solutions that work for everyone in containers in
general. And if Openvz is also interested in forkbombs protection that's even
better.
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