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Message-ID: <CALCETrVvQkLTwjfozr5RukRSvBMAZAHoWB8f=+qg-ASAE5_jFw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2012 13:00:30 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3.5 1/2] seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes
more consistent
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 11:31 AM, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 17, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> This fixes two issues that could cause incompatibility between
>> kernel versions:
>>
>> - If a tracer uses SECCOMP_RET_TRACE to select a syscall number
>> higher than the largest known syscall, emulate the unknown
>> vsyscall by returning -ENOSYS. (This is unlikely to make a
>> noticeable difference on x86-64 due to the way the system call
>> entry works.)
>>
>> - On x86-64 with vsyscall=emulate, skipped vsyscalls were buggy.
>>
>> This updates the documentation accordingly.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++---------------
>> kernel/seccomp.c | 13 +++-
>> 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>> index 597c3c5..1e469ef 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
>> @@ -95,12 +95,15 @@ SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
>>
>> SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
>> Results in the kernel sending a SIGSYS signal to the triggering
>> - task without executing the system call. The kernel will
>> - rollback the register state to just before the system call
>> - entry such that a signal handler in the task will be able to
>> - inspect the ucontext_t->uc_mcontext registers and emulate
>> - system call success or failure upon return from the signal
>> - handler.
>> + task without executing the system call. siginfo->si_call_addr
>> + will show the address of the system call instruction, and
>> + siginfo->si_syscall and siginfo->si_arch will indicate which
>> + syscall was attempted. The program counter will be as though
>> + the syscall happened (i.e. it will not point to the syscall
>> + instruction). The return value register will contain an arch-
>> + dependent value -- if resuming execution, set it to something
>> + sensible. (The architecture dependency is because replacing
>> + it with -ENOSYS could overwrite some useful information.)
>>
>> The SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the return value will be passed
>> as si_errno.
>> @@ -123,6 +126,18 @@ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
>> the BPF program return value will be available to the tracer
>> via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
>>
>> + The tracer can skip the system call by changing the syscall number
>> + to -1. Alternatively, the tracer can change the system call
>> + requested by changing the system call to a valid syscall number. If
>> + the tracer asks to skip the system call, then the system call will
>> + appear to return the value that the tracer puts in the return value
>> + register.
>> +
>> + The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is
>> + notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT
>> + allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
>> + extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
>> +
>> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> Results in the system call being executed.
>>
>> @@ -161,3 +176,50 @@ architecture supports both ptrace_event and seccomp, it will be able to
>> support seccomp filter with minor fixup: SIGSYS support and seccomp return
>> value checking. Then it must just add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>> to its arch-specific Kconfig.
>> +
>> +
>> +
>> +Caveats
>> +-------
>> +
>> +The vDSO can cause some system calls to run entirely in userspace,
>> +leading to surprises when you run programs on different machines that
>> +fall back to real syscalls. To minimize these surprises on x86, make
>> +sure you test with
>> +/sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource set to
>> +something like acpi_pm.
>> +
>> +On x86-64, vsyscall emulation is enabled by default. (vsyscalls are
>> +legacy variants on vDSO calls.) Currently, emulated vsyscalls will honor seccomp, with a few oddities:
>> +
>> +- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRAP will set a si_call_addr pointing to
>> + the vsyscall entry for the given call and not the address after the
>> + 'syscall' instruction. Any code which wants to restart the call
>> + should be aware that (a) a ret instruction has been emulated and (b)
>> + trying to resume the syscall will again trigger the standard vsyscall
>> + emulation security checks, making resuming the syscall mostly
>> + pointless.
>> +
>> +- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRACE will signal the tracer as usual,
>> + but the syscall may not be changed to another system call using the
>> + orig_rax register. It may only be changed to -1 order to skip the
>> + currently emulated call. Any other change MAY terminate the process.
>> + The rip value seen by the tracer will be the syscall entry address;
>> + this is different from normal behavior. The tracer MUST NOT modify
>> + rip or rsp. (Do not rely on other changes terminating the process.
>> + They might work. For example, on some kernels, choosing a syscall
>> + that only exists in future kernels will be correctly emulated (by
>> + returning -ENOSYS).
>> +
>> +To detect this quirky behavior, check for addr & ~0x0C00 ==
>> +0xFFFFFFFFFF600000. (For SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, use rip. For
>> +SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, use siginfo->si_call_addr.) Do not check any other
>> +condition: future kernels may improve vsyscall emulation and current
>> +kernels in vsyscall=native mode will behave differently, but the
>> +instructions at 0xF...F600{0,4,8,C}00 will not be system calls in these
>> +cases.
>> +
>> +Note that modern systems are unlikely to use vsyscalls at all -- they
>> +are a legacy feature and they are considerably slower than standard
>> +syscalls. New code will use the vDSO, and vDSO-issued system calls
>> +are indistinguishable from normal system calls.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> index 5db36ca..44a3a2e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> @@ -139,19 +139,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
>> return nr;
>> }
>>
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>> -static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr)
>> -{
>> - if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
>> - return 0;
>> - task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
>> - task_pt_regs(tsk)->ax = syscall_nr;
>> - return __secure_computing(syscall_nr);
>> -}
>> -#else
>> -#define vsyscall_seccomp(_tsk, _nr) 0
>> -#endif
>> -
>> static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
>> {
>> /*
>> @@ -184,10 +171,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> {
>> struct task_struct *tsk;
>> unsigned long caller;
>> - int vsyscall_nr;
>> + int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
>> int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
>> long ret;
>> - int skip;
>>
>> /*
>> * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
>> @@ -219,56 +205,84 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> }
>>
>> tsk = current;
>> - /*
>> - * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
>> - * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
>> - */
>> - prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error;
>> - current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1;
>>
>> /*
>> + * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
>> + *
>> * NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
>> * 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the
>> * vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at
>> * address 0".
>> */
>> - ret = -EFAULT;
>> - skip = 0;
>> switch (vsyscall_nr) {
>> case 0:
>> - skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_gettimeofday);
>> - if (skip)
>> - break;
>> -
>> if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
>> - !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone)))
>> - break;
>> + !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) {
>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>> + goto check_fault;
>> + }
>> +
>> + syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday;
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case 1:
>> + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) {
>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>> + goto check_fault;
>> + }
>> +
>> + syscall_nr = __NR_time;
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case 2:
>> + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
>> + !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) {
>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>> + goto check_fault;
>> + }
>> +
>> + syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu;
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value.
>> + * See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt.
>> + *
>> + * We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance
>> + * here doesn't matter.
>> + */
>> + regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
>> + regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
>> + tmp = secure_computing(syscall_nr);
>> + if ((regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr && !tmp) || regs->ip != address) {
>
> Would it make sense to check tmp first since it is the most common case?
This code is basically irrelevant from a performance perspective. If
I do another version, I'll change it.
>
> If it is skipping, is there any reason to block ip changes? Of
> course, I don't have a test for normal ptrace with IP change at
> syscall exit versus this, so I'm fine with it starting more
> restrictive.
>
The emulation of the ret instruction will blow away the ip change.
Giving the tracer the option to skip the ret emulation seems rather
silly.
We could get fancy by setting ip to point to the ret instruction,
which would be a little less odd. Then, if the tracer changed ip, we
could accept that change and skip the ret emulation. (This would
involve changing the docs, though.)
Or we could say "if the rip is in the vsyscall page, quirks may happen
or may not depending on kernel version. Test if you care." Thoughts?
(The only downside of this patch that I can see is that, if we make
that change later, we risk breaking something. But tracers really
have little business changing ip anyway, especially since it's
nontrivial (or even impossible) to find the original syscall entry
point on x86 given just the return address.
>> case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
>> /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
>> - if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP))
>> + if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
>> + syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
>> + -ENOSYS, 0);
>
> Thanks! I've been meaning to post this, but was waiting until I added
> a non-x86 arch :)
This hunk could be dropped for now, I guess. It's pretty clearly safe, though.
>
> Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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