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Message-Id: <1343991184-3619-1-git-send-email-berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 11:53:04 +0100
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
"Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@...hat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...e.fr>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Forbid invocation of kexec_load() outside initial PID namespace
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@...hat.com>
The following commit
commit cf3f89214ef6a33fad60856bc5ffd7bb2fc4709b
Author: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...e.fr>
Date: Wed Mar 28 14:42:51 2012 -0700
pidns: add reboot_pid_ns() to handle the reboot syscall
introduced custom handling of the reboot() syscall when invoked
from a non-initial PID namespace. The intent was that a process
in a container can be allowed to keep CAP_SYS_BOOT and execute
reboot() to shutdown/reboot just their private container, rather
than the host.
Unfortunately the kexec_load() syscall also relies on the
CAP_SYS_BOOT capability. So by allowing a container to keep
this capability to safely invoke reboot(), they mistakenly
also gain the ability to use kexec_load(). The solution is
to make kexec_load() return -EPERM if invoked from a PID
namespace that is not the initial namespace
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@...hat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...e.fr>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
---
kernel/kexec.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 0668d58..b152bde 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -947,6 +947,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
return -EPERM;
+ /* Processes in containers must not be allowed to load a new
+ * kernel, even if they have CAP_SYS_BOOT */
+ if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns)
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
--
1.7.11.2
--
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