[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20120806192040.GA27023@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2012 19:20:40 +0000
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...e.fr>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Forbid invocation of kexec_load() outside initial PID
namespace
Quoting Serge Hallyn (serge@...lyn.com):
> Eric,
>
> during the container reboot discussion, the agreement was reached that rebooting for real fron non-init pid ns is not safe. Restarting userspace (in pidns caller owns) is. I argue the same reasoning supports this.
>
> I haven't had a chance to review the patch, but the idea gets my ack. I'll look at the patch asap.
>
> I'm also fine with splitting cap_sys_boot into a user and system caps. The former would only be needed targeted to the userns of the init pid, while the latter would be required to init_user_ns. Then containers could safely be given cap_sys_restart or whatever, but not cap_sys_boot which authorizes kexec and machine reset/poweroff.
Splitting the cap up into CAP_RESTART (restart /sbin/init) and CAP_BOOT
(reboot hardware or kexec kernel) has the advantage that the capabilities
each remain simpler to parse, no 'in this context it means that'.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists