linux-kernel - Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] fs: add link restrictions

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20120812193210.GA16669@albatros>
Date:	Sun, 12 Aug 2012 23:32:10 +0400
From:	Vasily Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To:	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc:	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <matthew@....cx>,
	Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>,
	Joe Korty <joe.korty@...r.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] fs: add link restrictions

On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 23:34 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 5:19 AM, Vasily Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> > Hi Kees,
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 17:29 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> +/**
> >> + * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
> >> + * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
> >> + *
> >> + * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
> >> + *    - inode is not a regular file
> >> + *    - inode is setuid
> >> + *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
> >> + *    - access failure for read and write
> >> + *
> >> + * Otherwise returns true.
> >> + */
> >> +static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
> >> +{
> >> +     umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
> >> +
> >> +     /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
> >> +     if (!S_ISREG(mode))
> >> +             return false;
> >> +
> >> +     /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
> >> +     if (mode & S_ISUID)
> >> +             return false;
> >
> > We don't want to make hardlinks of SUID files, but we still allow to create
> > hardlinks to SUID'ish cap'ed files.  Probably check whether the inode is
> > setcap'ed?
> 
> Excellent idea. It doesn't look like there is anything "simple" to do
> this already. It'd be close to get_file_caps() but without the bprm.
> Maybe just get_vfs_caps_from_disk() and a walk of the caps? What would
> you recommend?

Yes, I think get_vfs_caps_from_disk() plus identifying whether any permitted
or inheritable capability is set or effective bit is set.  IOW, if there is
_anything_ related to cababilities in the file, it is protected.

> > Probably we can enhance this further and allow LSMs to define whether this
> > particular file is special in LSM's point of view (IOW, it can be able to move
> > a process to another security domain which is served by LSM).
> 
> Yeah. Perhaps implementing the needed check above with a new security
> check and have commoncaps do the vfs fetch with LSMs able to override?

Yep.  Then uid and gid checks from the above code should move to commoncaps
function as default candidates for "privileged files" checks.

Thanks,

-- 
Vasily Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/