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Message-ID: <20120816013834.872.7280.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 02:38:34 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: rusty@...tcorp.com.au
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com,
zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 24/25] MODSIGN: Allow modules to be signed with an unknown key
unless enforcing
Currently we fail the loading of modules that are signed with a public key
that is not in the modsign keyring even if we are not in enforcing mode.
This is somewhat at odds with the fact that we allow a completely unsigned
module to load in such a case.
We should allow modules signed with an unknown key to load in cases
where we are not enforcing and not in FIPS mode.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
kernel/module-verify.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c
index 070d730..c02d2e5 100644
--- a/kernel/module-verify.c
+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c
@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ int module_verify(const void *data, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* Signed, but we don't have the public key */
pr_err("Module signed with unknown public key\n");
+ if (!modsign_signedonly) {
+ /* Allow a module to be signed with an unknown public
+ * key unless we're enforcing.
+ */
+ pr_info("Allowing\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ }
break;
default: /* Other error (probably ENOMEM) */
break;
--
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