linux-kernel - [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1346774117-2277-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com>
Date:	Tue,  4 Sep 2012 11:55:06 -0400
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support 

The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a
user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS, even if that user has
administrative privileges. This is an initial attempt at a set of patches
to reduce root's ability to modify the kernel. We've done this with an
additional capability for a couple of reasons:

1) CAP_SYS_RAWIO already covers pretty much everything we want, but also
   disables a lot of functionality that we don't want to lose. Following
   the same model seems reasonable.
2) This capability may be more generically useful for some use-cases.
   Adding a set of hardcoded is_secure_boot() checks in the same places would
   prevent that.

Feedback welcome.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/