linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support

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Message-ID: <20120904161256.GA22961@srcf.ucam.org>
Date:	Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:12:56 +0100
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support

On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 05:08:53PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Tue,  4 Sep 2012 11:55:06 -0400
> Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com> wrote:
> 
> > The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a
> > user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS
> 
> Unfortunately you can't fix this at kernel level because an untrusted
> application can at GUI level fake a system crash, reboot cycle and phish
> any basic credentials such as passwords for the windows partition.

Any well-designed software asking for credentials should already be 
requiring a SAK, so in that case we just need to implement sensible SAK 
support in Linux.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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