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Date:	Tue, 04 Sep 2012 13:13:32 -0700
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment


Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com> writes:

> kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
> to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
> support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
> loading entirely in that situation.

Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>

This makes no sense.  The naming CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE is attrocious,
you aren't implementing or enforcing secure firmware.

You don't give any justification for this other than to support some
silly EFI feature.  Why would anyone want this if we were not booting
under EFI?

Eric
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