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Message-ID: <20120905154753.GE14225@amd1>
Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 10:47:53 -0500
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stacked
Quoting Kees Cook (keescook@...omium.org):
> Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
> no matter what LSM module is primary.
>
> Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
> has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
> distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
> to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.
I don't really like having both the STACKED and non-stacked paths. But
I don't have a good alternative.
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> security/yama/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 3dea6a9..01ef030 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -3021,5 +3021,36 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
> { }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
> +extern int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> + unsigned int mode);
> +extern int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> +extern void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
> +extern int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> +#else
> +static inline int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> + unsigned int mode)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
> + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
> + unsigned long arg5)
> +{
> + return -ENOSYS;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA */
> +
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 860aeb3..68c1b9b 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -136,11 +136,23 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
>
> int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> + int rc;
> + rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> }
>
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> + int rc;
> + rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
> }
>
> @@ -761,6 +773,9 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
>
> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> + yama_task_free(task);
> +#endif
> security_ops->task_free(task);
> }
>
> @@ -876,6 +891,12 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
> {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> + int rc;
> + rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
> + if (rc != -ENOSYS)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
> index 51d6709..20ef514 100644
> --- a/security/yama/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
> @@ -11,3 +11,11 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA
> Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
> +config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> + bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
> + depends on SECURITY_YAMA
> + default n
> + help
> + When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
> + selected primary LSM.
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index dcd6178..b4c2984 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
> * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
> * @task: task being removed
> */
> -static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> +void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
> }
> @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> * Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
> * does not handle the given option.
> */
> -static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> +int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
> {
> int rc;
> @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
> *
> * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
> */
> -static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> +int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
> @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> *
> * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
> */
> -static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> +int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> {
> int rc;
>
> @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
> .name = "yama",
>
> @@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
> .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
> .task_free = yama_task_free,
> };
> +#endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> @@ -378,13 +380,17 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
>
> static __init int yama_init(void)
> {
> +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
> return 0;
> +#endif
>
> printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
>
> +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
> if (register_security(&yama_ops))
> panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
> +#endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
> --
> 1.7.0.4
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
> --
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