linux-kernel - [PATCH 00/11] x86: Supervisor Mode Access Prevention

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Date:	Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:04 -0700
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
To:	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linda Wang <lwang@...hat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 00/11] x86: Supervisor Mode Access Prevention

Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security feature
disclosed by Intel in revision 014 of the Intel® Architecture
Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference:

http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf

When SMAP is active, the kernel cannot normally access pages that are
user space (U=1).  Since the kernel does have the need to access user
space pages under specific circumstances, an override is provided: the
kernel can access user space pages if EFLAGS.AC=1.  For system data
structures, e.g. descriptor tables, that are accessed by the processor
directly, SMAP is active even in CPL 3 regardless of EFLAGS.AC.

SMAP also includes two new instructions, STAC and CLAC, to flip the AC
flag more quickly.

Note: patch 01/11 is already in tip:x86/cpufeature.

List of patches:
      x86, cpufeature: Add feature bit for SMAP
      x86-32, mm: The WP test should be done on a kernel page
      x86, smap: Add CR4 bit for SMAP
      x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection
      x86, alternative: Add header guards to <asm/alternative-asm.h>
      x86, smap: Add a header file with macros for STAC/CLAC
      x86, uaccess: Merge prototypes for clear_user/__clear_user
      x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access
      x86, smap: Turn on Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
      x86, smap: A page fault due to SMAP is an oops
      x86, smap: Reduce the SMAP overhead for signal handling

Diff stat:

 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt    |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                       |   11 ++++
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c            |   12 +++--
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S              |    6 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h |    9 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h     |   32 ++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h      |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h    |   10 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h           |   19 +++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h            |   91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h         |   28 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h      |    3 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h      |    3 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h           |   10 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c           |   29 ++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S             |   11 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c               |   24 +++++----
 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S            |    7 +++
 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S    |    3 +
 arch/x86/lib/getuser.S                 |   10 ++++
 arch/x86/lib/putuser.S                 |    8 +++-
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c             |   13 ++++-
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c             |    3 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                    |   18 ++++++
 arch/x86/mm/init_32.c                  |    2 +-
 26 files changed, 301 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
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