linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd

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Message-ID: <1348196986.23350.7.camel@falcor.watson.ibm.com>
Date:	Thu, 20 Sep 2012 23:09:46 -0400
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd

On Fri, 2012-09-21 at 12:22 +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 20 Sep 2012, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> > Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
> > useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
> > keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
> > contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
> > modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
> > would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
> > module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
> 
> Just out of interest, has anyone else expressed interest in using this 
> feature?

I'm not so interested in this particular use case, but am interested in
using the new syscall's file descriptor for measuring/appraising a
kernel module's integrity.

thanks,

Mimi


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