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Message-ID: <87txunwi84.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 08:31:07 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
Cc: linux-next@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Subject: Re: linux-next: manual merge of the userns tree with the security tree
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au> writes:
> Hi Eric,
>
> Today's linux-next merge of the userns tree got a conflict in
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c between commit 07f6a79415d7 ("ima:
> add appraise action keywords and default rules") from the security tree
> and commit 8b94eea4bfb8 ("userns: Add user namespace support to IMA") from
> the userns tree.
>
> I fixed it up (see below) but it probably needs more and can carry the
> fix as necessary (no action is required).
Right. To work when user namespace support is enabled fowner needs be
converted to a kuid_t as well.
When I did a trial earlier this is what I wound up with. As long as
user namespaces are not enabled what you wound up with should be fine.
Eric
diff --cc security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c84df05,cda9031..346fe8f
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@@ -39,7 -45,8 +45,8 @@@ struct ima_rule_entry
enum ima_hooks func;
int mask;
unsigned long fsmagic;
- uid_t uid;
- uid_t fowner;
+ kuid_t uid;
++ kuid_t fowner;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
int type; /* audit type */
@@@ -75,14 -82,28 +82,28 @@@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_ru
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
- static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
- static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
- static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = 0,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
++ {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+ };
+
+ static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
+ static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
+ static struct list_head *ima_rules;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
- static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
{
ima_use_tcb = 1;
return 1;
@@@ -112,8 -141,10 +141,10 @@@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid)
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
return false;
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && rule->fowner != inode->i_uid)
++ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
+ return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid, sid;
@@@ -277,7 -336,8 +336,8 @@@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, s
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
- entry->uid = -1;
- entry->fowner = -1;
+ entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
++ entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
entry->action = UNKNOWN;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@@ -375,6 -459,23 +459,23 @@@
entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
}
break;
+ case Opt_fowner:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
+
- if (entry->fowner != -1) {
++ if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+ if (!result) {
- entry->fowner = (uid_t) lnum;
- if (entry->fowner != lnum)
++ entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t) lnum);
++ if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || ((uid_t)lnum != lnum))
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
+ }
+ break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
--
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