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Message-ID: <8168.1348650575@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2012 10:09:35 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, herbert@...dor.hengli.com.au,
pjones@...hat.com, jwboyer@...hat.com,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Asymmetric keys and module signing
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au> wrote:
> We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module
> (which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config
> option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept (and taint) or
> fail with unsigned modules.
I've adjusted your patch description to this:
We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module
(which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config
option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with
unsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key.
If module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is
accepted that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't have the
key.
I think it's worth mentioning the policy for unknown keys and worth making
clear under what circumstances we mean the kernel to be tainted.
David
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