linux-kernel - [ 030/120] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20121011005831.083883510@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Thu, 11 Oct 2012 09:59:42 +0900
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [ 030/120] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------


From: Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>

[ Upstream commit 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 ]

The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1405,6 +1405,7 @@ static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm
 		struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
 		struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
 
+		memset(up, 0, sizeof(*up));
 		memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
 		up->family = kp->encap_family;
 		memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/