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Date:	Thu, 18 Oct 2012 08:30:27 -0700
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC:	mtk.manpages@...il.com, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd

On 10/18/2012 08:28 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> The goal for finit_module is to make sure we're getting what's on the
> filesystem, not an arbitrary blob, so we can reason about it for
> security policy.
>

Yes, I get that... although I'm starting to think that that might 
actually be a really bad idea.

>> was confused about the functioning of the *current* init_module() system
>> call.
>>
>> Given that, I have to say I now seriously question the value of
>> finit_module().  The kernel can trivially discover if the pointed-to memory
>> area is a MAP_SHARED mmap() of a file descriptor and if so which file
>> descriptor... why can't we handle this behind the scenes?
>
> This makes me very nervous. I worry that it adds needless complexity
> (it'd be many more checks besides "is it MAP_SHARED?", like "does the
> memory region show the whole file?" "is the offset zero?" etc). Also
> are we sure the memory area would be truly be unmodifiable in the case
> where the filesystem is read-only?

You may need to check for PROT_READONLY as well.

	-hpa

-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.

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