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Message-ID: <1350692142.14835.46.camel@linux-s257.site>
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2012 08:15:42 +0800
From: joeyli <jlee@...e.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 01/10] Secure boot: Add new capability
Hi Matt,
Sorry for bother you!
I didn't see this Matthew's patchset merged in EFI git tree. Do you have
plan to merge it? Or those patches need wait different subsystem leaders
merge.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
於 四,2012-09-20 於 10:40 -0400,Matthew Garrett 提到:
> Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
> be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
> The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
> and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
> capability set if required.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index d10b7ed..4345bc8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
> +/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
> +
> +#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37
> +
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
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