linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Kdump with signed images

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <1351148497.18115.80.camel@falcor>
Date:	Thu, 25 Oct 2012 03:01:37 -0400
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>,
	Khalid Aziz <khalid@...ehiking.org>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
	horms@...ge.net.au, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Kdump with signed images

On Wed, 2012-10-24 at 23:44 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 10:43 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2012-10-24 at 13:19 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >> On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 09:44:59AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> > Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com> writes:
> >> >
> >> > > On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 10:59:20AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > >> But what about creation of a new program which can call kexec_load()
> >> > >> and execute an unsigned kernel. Doesn't look like that will be
> >> > >> prevented using IMA.
> >
> > Like the existing kernel modules, kexec_load() is not file descriptor
> > based.  There isn't an LSM or IMA-appraisal hook here.
> >
> >> > > Right. Trusting userspace would require a new system call that passes in
> >> > > a signature of the userspace binary, and the kernel would then have to
> >> > > verify the ELF object in memory in order to ensure that it
> >> > > matches the signature. Verifying that the copy on the filesystem is
> >> > > unmodified isn't adequate - an attacker could simply have paused the
> >> > > process and injected code.
> >
> > I haven't looked at kexec_load() in detail, but like kernel modules, I
> > think the better solution would be to pass a file descriptor, especially
> > if you're discussing a new system call.  (cc'ing Kees.)
> 
> Yeah, it looks like kexec_load could use a nearly identical new
> syscall that uses an fd, just like init_module is getting.
> 
> Another area, kind of related, is firmware loading. The interface for
> that is a bit weird, if the documentation is up to date:
> 
>         echo 1 > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
>         cat $HOTPLUG_FW_DIR/$FIRMWARE > /sysfs/$DEVPATH/data
>         echo 0 > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> 
> It looks like there's a filp on the reader:
> 
> static ssize_t firmware_data_read(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
>                                   struct bin_attribute *bin_attr,
>                                   char *buffer, loff_t offset, size_t count)
> 
> But it's not clear to me yet if we'll actually get the firmware file,
> or if we'll get a random pipe we can't evaluate. Has anyone looked at
> handling "signed" firmware loading yet?
> 
> -Kees

Only looked at it enough to mention at LSS, that it's needed.

Mimi


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/